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noir, could, that most French settlers in Algeria were not the owners of large 
agricultural estates but modest members of the working class. In truth, Camus 
had long been a more articulate critic of French colonial rule than Sartre or 
most of the Parisian left. Indeed he quit the Communist Party after two years 
in the late 1930s in protest against its general indifference to colonial issues. 
But Camus could not get past the violence of the National Liberation Front 
(FLN). The man who had courageously denounced the savage French repres- 
sion at Setif in 1945 could not, a decade later, appreciate that FLN violence had 
almost always been proceeded and exceeded by that of the French. Camus had 
been ahead of his times in protesting the abuses of colonial rule; what ulti- 
mately escaped him was that the problem lay in the colonial system itself. 
Sartre, for all his periodic blindness, understood this perfectly. 
Aronson's insistence that the rupture between Sartre and Camus was a 
tragic product of the Cold War is well argued. Yet it is entirely possible that 
some parting of the ways would have happened anyway. Camus was notori- 
ously thin skinned. Sartre and his companion Simone de Beauvoir had always 
been slightly miffed that, despite the genuine fhendship that existed between 
the three in the 1940s, Camus was never prepared, as so many of their acolytes 
were, to be part of the couple's adoring "famille" on the Rue St. Germain. It 
cannot have been easy for Sartre, the senior by eight years and the most pres- 
tigious normalien of his generation to be considered the equal of a man with 
the hnctional equivalent of an MA from a provincial university and to have 
received his Nobel prize seven years after his younger colleague. And, as both 
men were avid womanizers, it cannot have escaped Sartre that the infinitely 
more handsome Camus enjoyed a substantial advantage in that department. 
Nonetheless this is an important book. Aronson is at ease with the philo- 
sophic nuances of both men's writing; he is also comfortable with the histori- 
cal context. His writing is lucid and delightfully free of jargon. Although a 
great deal has been written about the post-1945 intellectual history of France, 
this book is high on the list of "must reads." 
William D. Irvine 
York University 
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Those who are interested in the cultural identity of twentieth-century France, 
and more precisely in the struggle for the legitimate cultural identity of France, 
cannot avoid Herman Lebovics' scholarship. After, among other works, True 
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France The Wars over Cultural Identity, 1900-1945 (1994), the author of 
Bringing the Empire Back Home tackles the period of the Fifth Republic and 
several milestones in its history: the farmers' protest movement of the Larzac 
region, the reconstitution of French ethnography, and the impact of Jean-Marie 
Le Pen on the debate over French cultural identity. The author is right to remind 
the reader that contrary to Samuel Huntington's highly questionable theories, a 
national cultural identity is not one-dimensional, nor does it refer to universal 
values (Christianity, for example); on the contrary, it develops from the ten- 
sions existing between the various stakeholders within a society (groups, social 
classes, etc.). 
Lebovics' book could be summed up in a few words. To understand pres- 
ent-day France, one must explore, in his view, three historical vectors: first, the 
power of Paris in the history of republican France; second, the narrative and 
impact of regional aspirations and movements; third, at the intersection of the 
two vectors previously mentioned, the colonial and postcolonial Empire of 
France. 
The provocative thesis of this book is that relations between Paris and its 
colonies were reproduced in metropolitan cultural policies towards the regions 
of France. This reproduction was mainly due to the redeployment of former 
colonial officials who possessed a certain "hands-on know-how" (180) as 
regional administrators following decolonisation. This practice was introduced 
by Andrt Malraux, the Minister of Cultural Affairs (1959-69), and it sparked 
significant resistance from local movements. The mobilisation of farmers from 
the Larzac region in the 1970s was a good example that Lebovics explores. 
The author shows that the success of the Larzac farmers was due, in part, 
to their ability to garner support from unexpected quarters. Against Michel 
Debrk (former Prime Minister and Minister of Defense at the time) who, as did 
virtually all contemporary political and economic elites, supported modernisa- 
tion (of the Army, for instance), the farmers broadened their audience by sup- 
porting a wide variety of causes such as "anti-colonialism, anti-militarism, the 
struggles for local power against a central domination, a new internationalised 
regional consciousness, ecology as a political force, and new-media-sawy 
strategies of resistance" (17). The Larzac area saw a convergence of people as 
diverse as: nationalist leaders from Caledonia (Kanak) and Corsica; Occitans; 
Japanese farmers; IRA sympathisers; Cheyenne native American activists; 
retired generals; journalists; Roquefort cheese producers; intellectual left-wing 
activists working in factories (the ktablis); social Catholics encouraged by the 
liberal politics of Rome after Vatican 11, and so on. The only common charac- 
teristic between these disparate groups was that they were "allied - however 
uneasily - against the State and its army" (35). Pioneers of new forms of mobil- 
isation (squatting, media actions, etc.), the Larzac farmers' success was all the 
more remarkable given that France, hit hard by the economic crisis of the 
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1970s, looked to a sanitized mythical past for a sense of stability and identity 
- a past where produits du terrozr had no place. 
The success of a handful of farmers against the power of an omnipotent 
central government is a singular one. Nonetheless, the leaders of this move- 
ment do not lend themselves readily to the image of farmers as traditionally 
conceived. As was shown by Anthony Obershall in Social Conflict and Social 
Movements (1973), the leaders of a movement such as this one possess traits 
which are clearly distinct from the groups for which they are the purported 
spokesmen. As regards the attempt to explain the mobilisations of these vari- 
ous groups (especially the "2tablis") who were pitted against the government 
and the economic modernity that it embodied, Lebovics explicitly refutes Max 
Weber's theory according to which such radical mobilisations are the product 
of an upheaval of the structure and social mobility of a given society (23). It is 
perhaps this point that deserves closer inspection. Several scholars, including 
Raymond Boudon, have suggested that it was the bloated system of education 
in France that lay at the origin, at least in part, of the student revolt of May 
1968. Moreover, the devaluation of academic qualifications resulting from this 
distending of the education system led to surprising patterns among the hold- 
ers of said qualifications such as the formation of hippy communities. Jost 
BovC, one of the leaders at the forefront of the French farming opposition, per- 
fectly embodies this phenomenon: the son of university educated parents, and 
himself educated for a time at Berkeley College, he became a producer of 
Roquefort cheese in the Larzac region following a chaotic academic career. 
Apart from and beyond the fight between central government and local 
political opposition groups, the quest for a legitimate cultural French identity 
is linked back to the role which each of these groups play(ed) in the social 
structure. Between a man like Michel Debre and the farming leaders there also 
lies the question of the legitimisation of social and political elites. Lebovics, in 
True France, made this same observation when analysing the radical opposi- 
tion between Louis Marin, the champion of French conservative social science, 
and Paul Rivet, a member of the anthropological school of Durkheim and 
Mauss. Behind conflicting visions or paradigms of the world there also lies a 
battle for legitimacy. 
Laurent Kestel 
Paris-I, Sorbonne University 
